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The relationship between corporate reputation and investment results is the subject of ongoing
debate. Some argue that high-quality firms ultimately provide superior stock price performance;
others counter that stock prices already reflect these firms’prospects for growth and profitability.
This study advances the debate by providing fresh evidence that investing in high-quality firms
yields above-average returns and that these superior returns continue for up to five years.
Individuals and institutions investing in the stock 
market often prefer to buy shares of high-quality, or
“blue-chip,” companies. Indeed, some asset managers
advocate a policy of investing exclusively in stocks
of leading firms. Such strategies raise an interesting
question: Does investing in well-regarded companies
earn abnormally high returns—that is, returns that out-
perform the market? 
Judging from the mixed opinions encountered, the
answer is not obvious. Investors who favor the “glam-
our” stocks of well-managed companies argue that
these firms experience superior growth and profitabil-
ity, which ultimately translate into superior stock price
performance. Yet many academics question this claim.
They point to decades of research supporting the argu-
ment that the stock market values shares efficiently—
which is to say, a company’s prospects for growth and
profitability are already reflected in its stock price.1
According to these skeptics, current stock prices should
reflect future prospects, especially for large, well-
regarded firms that are closely watched by hundreds of
market professionals. It follows, they contend, that
investing in shares of high-quality firms should offer no
special profit opportunities. 
In this edition of Current Issues, we bring new evi-
dence to the debate over the merits of investing in
highly regarded firms. Using the 1983-95 rankings of
firms from Fortune magazine’s annual survey America’s
Most Admired Companies (AMAC), we classify firms in
ten deciles—from the most to the least favorably
regarded—and track their stock performance. We find
that the decile of firms deemed most admired consis-
tently outperforms the market, yielding abnormally
high returns, while the least-admired decile of firms
consistently underperforms it, producing abnormally
low returns. 
These findings suggest that, on the whole, a high-
quality firm is indeed a high-quality investment. They
also suggest that market participants underreact to the
presence of corporate quality in the short term. If the
market reacts efficiently to corporate quality, one would
expect investors to bid up the shares of high-quality
companies to levels that would preclude earning above-
average future returns. Our analysis shows, however,
that the superior returns on the stocks of well-regarded
companies are sustained over a long horizon. Cumulative
five-year returns to investing in the most-admired firms
are 125 percent; returns to investing in the least-admired
firms are just 80 percent. Thus, although reputation
contains information about a company’s future perfor-
mance, the information is not rapidly incorporated into
the company’s stock price.  
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Glamour versus Value Stocks
Buying shares in firms with fast sales growth and
attractive prospects has proved especially popular with
investors. Recent academic research, however, argues
that glamour stocks are unlikely to yield unusually high
returns. Indeed, some studies have found these stocks to
be poor investments that produce below-average results.
According to Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994),
investors who adopt a so-called contrarian strategy by
buying unpopular “value” stocks—stocks of companies
with slow historic sales growth and uncertain
prospects—fare better than holders of glamour stocks. 
Researchers have advanced different theories to
explain why glamour stocks would produce below-average
returns. Fama and French (1992) argue that investors
are willing to accept more modest returns from invest-
ing in high-quality companies because these companies
pose a lower level of risk. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and
Vishny speculate that investors may accept a smaller
return because they derive pleasure from owning shares
of blue-chip firms. Another explanation proposed by
Lakonishok et al. is that investors may focus too heavily
on past performance and fail to recognize that highly
profitable stocks tend to revert to the mean. 
Whatever the underlying cause, this research sug-
gests that glamour stocks generally provide subpar
returns. Yet these studies typically categorize firms on
the basis of statistics such as past returns, growth rates,
and market valuation ratios—rather than corporate 
reputation per se. This distinction is important because
not all stocks sporting lofty market-to-book or price-to-
earnings ratios are those of well-regarded companies.
To differentiate more precisely between firms that have
reputations for being well respected and those whose
stock simply has extreme valuation ratios, our analysis
ranks firms based on their scores in Fortune magazine’s
annual survey America’s Most Admired Companies.2
The AMAC Survey and Our Methodology
Each fall, Fortune magazine sends its AMAC survey to
thousands of executives and analysts, asking them to
evaluate their industry’s ten largest firms using several
measures of corporate quality. The survey, published in
the following spring, has grown in scope from twenty
industries in 1983 to fifty-five at present. Respondents
are asked to score the firms, on a 0 to 10 scale, in eight
different areas: quality of management; quality of 
products and services; innovation; value as a long-term
investment; financial soundness; ability to attract,
develop, and keep talented people; community and envi-
ronmental responsibility; and use of corporate assets. 
Fortune determines each firm’s ranking on the basis
of its overall score, which we call its “Fortune rating,”
defined as an average of the firm’s scores in the eight
areas. The magazine reports this overall rating, but not
the scores in each area. To ensure that our analysis is
dependent solely on published information, we use the
Fortune rating as a proxy for corporate reputation.
Each April, following publication of the survey, we
form investment portfolios based on corporate reputa-
tion. We begin by excluding all nonpublicly traded
firms from the sample.3 We sort the remaining firms
into three portfolios: the first represents the decile of
most-admired firms; the second, the decile of least-
admired firms; and the third, all firms in the other eight
deciles. Next, we eliminate firms whose accounting
data are unavailable on Compustat, because these data
will be required later. By removing such firms early, we
maintain a consistent sample for most of our analysis.4
This exercise reveals basic characteristics of the
three “reputation” portfolios of firms over the survey
period (Table 1). The most-admired firms generally are
found to be larger and to have lower book-to-market
ratios (which, according to finance theory, reflect 
superior growth prospects) than the other firms.5 These
firms also exhibit more consistent profitability, higher
stock returns over the past three years, less variability
Table 1
Characteristics of Reputation Portfolios, 1983-95
Most-Admired Least-Admired  Other
Characteristic Decile Decile Deciles
Fortune rating
(reputation) 7.79 4.48 6.35
Market value of equity
(billions of 1992 dollars) 13.53 1.04 3.23
Book-to-market ratio 0.34 1.11 0.66
Return over previous
six months (percent) 13.9 13.6 12.9
Return over previous 
three years (percent) 100.5 12.0 70.7
Frequency of net losses 
over previous twelve
quarters (percent) 2 38 10
Beta 1.07 1.36 1.14
Standard deviation
of annual returns 0.28 0.46 0.31
Average number
of firms in portfolio 24.2 19.2 190.2
Sources: For rankings, Fortune magazine survey America’s Most Admired
Companies (1983-95); for returns data, Center for Research of Stock Prices; for
accounting data,Compustat.
Notes: Market value of equity and book-to-market ratio are the averages of the
annual median values. The other reported values represent the averages of the
annual mean values. Book-to-market ratio is defined as the book value of equity
divided by the market value of equity. Beta measures the sensitivity of the firms’
returns to the stock market index. For example, a beta of 1.07 for the most-
admired decile means that a 1.00 percent unexpected increase in the stock market
index on average causes a 1.07 percent increase in the value of that decile’s port-
folio. Figures are estimated at the time of portfolio formation at the start of April
in the year of survey publication. For details, see Antunovich and Laster (1999).of returns, and a lower sensitivity to overall stock mar-
ket movements, as reflected in their “beta.”6 The least-
admired firms possess the opposite characteristics.
Using information from the survey, we find that cor-
porate reputations tend to persist over time. A firm in
the most-admired decile has a 75 percent probability of
remaining there the next year and a 51 percent chance
of being there five years later. The probability that a
firm in the least-admired decile will remain there in the
next year is 59 percent—and in five years,16 percent.
Returns to Corporate Reputation
To determine the returns to investing in high-quality
firms, we examine an investment strategy using our
three reputation portfolios. As noted, the portfolios are
formed at the start of each April. They contain equal
weights, or dollar amounts, of each stock, and they are
held for five years. Each subsequent April, we rebalance
the portfolios to again hold equal weights of each stock.
Firms delisted during the previous year are dropped.7
Our investment strategy reveals that high-quality
firms indeed provide superior returns (Table 2). Panel A
presents the incremental annual returns to corporate 
reputation for the five years following portfolio forma-
tion. On average, the decile of most-admired firms out-
performed the least-admired decile by 5.2 percent a year
(penultimate row). The cumulative difference is even
more striking: the five-year return to the most-admired
firms was 125 percent, compared with an 80 percent
return to the least-admired firms (bottom row).
High-quality firms are also found to yield abnormally
high returns, judging from their strong performance
against the market. In panel B of Table 2, we measure
the returns of these firms against a market index—a
benchmark portfolio of all stocks listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange,
and NASDAQ—weighted in proportion to the firms’
respective market capitalizations. The most-admired
firms outperformed the index by an average of 3.7 per-
cent per year, while the least-admired firms lagged it
by 1.6 percent per year.8 This pattern is consistent
throughout the five years after the survey: each year, the
most-admired firms fared better than the market, while
in four of the five years, the least-admired fared worse.
Examining the Abnormal Returns
The abnormally high returns generated by the shares of
the most-admired firms suggest that corporate reputa-
tion, as perceived by industry executives and analysts,
is not fully reflected in the current stock price. This
result is surprising given the characteristics of the most-
admired firms. They have a larger market capitalization
and a lower book-to-market ratio than the least-admired
group—two characteristics that Fama and French
(1992) associate with lower returns.9
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Table 2
Returns to Corporate Reputation Portfolios, 1983-95
Percent
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Adjusted for Size and 
Unadjusted Market-Adjusted Book-to-Market Effects
Most-Admired Least-Admired Other Most-Admired Least-Admired Other Most-Admired Least-Admired Other
Returns Decile Decile Deciles Decile Decile Deciles Decile Decile Deciles
R1 18.3 11.9 16.0 3.7 -2.8 1.6 3.0 -5.0 0.4
R2 20.2 14.3 17.0 4.8 -1.1 1.2 3.4 -0.7 0.6
R3 19.1 14.3 17.0 4.0 -0.7 1.5 1.8 -1.7 0.4
R4 15.8 13.7 14.0 2.9 0.6 1.0 0.3 -1.5 -0.2
R5 15.0 8.3 13.2 3.1 -3.8 1.2 1.4 -6.8 -0.1
AR 17.7 12.5 15.3 3.7** -1.6 1.3 2.0* -3.1* 0.2
CR 125.5 80.0 103.6 19.9** -7.6 6.7 10.2* -14.8* 1.1
Sources: For rankings, Fortune magazine survey America’s Most Admired Companies (1983-95); for returns data, Center for Research of Stock Prices.
Notes: Portfolios are formed at the start of April after the survey publication and are held for five years. Each April, the stocks that were delisted during the year are eliminated
from the portfolios and the remaining stocks are rebalanced into equally weighted portfolios. Panel A presents the unadjusted returns; panel B shows the returns measured
against a value-weighted market index of all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ; panel C depicts the returns measured
against a set of seventy size and book-to-market reference portfolios. 
R1 through R5 denote the incremental annual returns in years one through five. For example, in the first year following portfolio formation, an investment in the portfolio of 
most-admired firms would earn an average return of 18.3 percent. AR denotes an average annual return in the five years following portfolio formation. A five-year investment in
the portfolio of most-admired firms, for instance, would earn an average annual return of 17.7 percent. CR denotes a five-year compounded return. For example, an estimated
five-year compounded return on the most-admired decile is 125.5 percent.
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
**Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.To determine whether the return differences across
our three portfolios are attributable to size and book-to-
market effects rather than corporate reputation, we
compute returns adjusted for these characteristics.
These returns are based on a grid of seventy size and
book-to-market reference portfolios as proposed by
Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999).10 The size- and book-to-
market-adjusted returns are calculated by subtracting
from the return on each sample firm the return on the
corresponding reference portfolio that best matches the
sample firm according to its size and market-to-book
ratio. If the returns to reputation are attributable to
these characteristics, the returns adjusted for size and
book-to-market effects should be statistically indistin-
guishable from zero. 
Our results reject this hypothesis. Size and book-to-
market effects cannot explain the abnormal positive
returns to the decile of most-admired firms or the
abnormal negative returns to the decile of least-admired
firms. The decile of most-admired firms outperformed
the reference portfolios by 2.0 percent per year while
the least-admired firms underperformed the reference
portfolios by 3.1 percent (Table 2, panel C). Both results
are significant at the 5 percent level.11
We also address the possibility that our abnormal
returns to reputation derive from other anomalies docu-
mented in the literature. For example, Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993) find that the stocks with the best returns
over the past six months continue doing well for up to
nine months thereafter, while the opposite is true for 
the laggards. Our results cannot be explained by this
“momentum” anomaly because our deciles of most- 
and least-admired firms produce almost identical
returns over the past six months (Table 1). Furthermore,
whereas stock returns exhibit a short-run momentum,
they tend to revert in the long run. DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985, 1987), for instance, find that the “winner”
stocks—those with the best performance over the past
three years—tend to underperform the market for the
next several years, while the past “losers” outperform it.
For our results to be consistent with this “reversal”
anomaly, the returns on the most-admired decile should
trail those of the least-admired decile over the past three
years. However, as Table 1 shows, we find just the
opposite. Therefore, the superior performance of the
most-admired firms cannot be attributed to either
momentum or reversal anomalies.
In addition, we examine the extent to which the
abnormal returns to reputation can be attributed to
industry effects. In a more formal analysis (Antunovich
and Laster 1999), we find a roughly even split between
industry- and firm-specific components. In other
words, industries whose firms on average have high
Fortune ratings are found to outperform industries with
low ratings. This result suggests that the observed mis-
pricing is due partly to the reputation of the individual
firms and partly to the reputation of the entire industry.
Executives’ and Analysts’ Rankings
The Fortune survey draws upon the expertise of two
industry groups: executives and analysts. By isolating
the ratings assigned by one group from those assigned
by the other, we should obtain information that reflects
each group’s unique relationship with its industry.12 A
comparison of the ratings of the two groups will then
allow us to address some interesting questions.
First, how similar are the reputation rankings of each
group? Agreement among executives and analysts on
rankings would make us more comfortable using the
survey data as a proxy for a firm’s underlying quality.
Second, how do the stocks favored by each group fare
as investments? If there is a clear disparity in stock per-
formance, we might conclude that one group’s rankings
reflect superior insight into the future performance of
firms in its industry—and that the portfolio returns
based on those rankings result from this insight.
To explore these questions, we follow the same 
procedure of sorting firms into three portfolios (most-
admired, least-admired, and other deciles), but in this
case, we create two sets of portfolios to reflect the dif-
ferent rankings assigned by our two respondent groups.
We find that the composition of the deciles is very 
similar for the analysts and the executives: the overlap
between rankings is 57 percent for the most-admired
firms and 69 percent for the least-admired ones. (If the
reputation scores were merely a random occurrence, the
overlaps would have been only about 10 percent.) Such
large overlaps suggest that reputation has fundamental
elements upon which respondents can agree and that the
survey data—by consistently capturing this informa-
tion—are a suitable proxy for corporate quality.
Next, we determine how the analysts’and executives’
most- and least-admired firms fared. Taken individually,
each group’s decile of most-admired firms outperformed
the market. Over a one-year horizon, the decile of firms
most admired by executives outperformed the market in
eight of eleven years, compared with seven years for the
analysts’decile. A direct comparison between executives
and analysts, however, yields mixed results. Although
the executives’ most-admired decile outperformed the
analysts’ top decile in seven of eleven years, it had a
slightly lower average return over the entire sample. By
contrast, over a five-year investment horizon, the execu-
tives show a clear advantage: their most-admired decile
outperformed the analysts’ decile by 12 percent; their
least-admired decile underperformed the analysts’decile
by 19 percent (see chart). 
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lysts are indeed valuable components of the Fortune
survey. Nevertheless, executives appear to have clearer
insight into the future performance of companies. This
advantage cannot be attributed to insider information,
because executives are evaluating other firms in their
industry, not their own. Rather, it is possible that execu-
tives’close knowledge of their own firms gives them an
edge in assessing their industry peers.
Conclusion
Our analysis of the relationship between corporate 
reputation and stock returns suggests that reputation
plays an important long-term role in shaping investment
results. We find that the most-admired firms, as
reported in a Fortune magazine survey, on average out-
perform the market, while the least-admired firms
underperform it. Our results are not driven by size,
book-to-market, or momentum effects. These findings
suggest that investors actually underreact to corporate
quality in the short term, such that an investment in the
most-admired firms yields higher returns than an invest-
ment in the least-admired firms for at least five years
after the survey is published. Our findings add to a
series of anomalies in which investors underreact to
public information, such as the incomplete reaction to
earnings surprises (Bernard and Thomas 1990) and an
underreaction to analysts’ buy-and-sell recommenda-
tions (Womack 1996).13
In addition, industry executives’ opinions of firm
reputation are found to be better predictors of stock
returns than the opinions of industry analysts. The
difference is especially pronounced for investment
horizons of more than one year. This finding suggests
that executives may have a better understanding of their
industry than do analysts, who in turn are better
informed than the investing public.
Notes
1. Fama (1970, 1991) provides an excellent review of this research.
2. Shefrin and Statman (1995, 1998) also use the AMAC rankings
in their research. However, they do not examine the returns to
investing in portfolios of well-regarded or poorly regarded firms.
3. For a firm to be included in our analysis, its returns must be
available on the Center for Research of Stock Prices (CRSP) data-
base and its accounting data must be available on the Compustat
database. CRSP and Compustat are the standard sources for U.S.
stock price and accounting data.  
4. In particular, accounting figures are needed to adjust stock
returns for the effects of firm size and book-to-market ratio. Note
that we eliminate the firms without the relevant Compustat data only
after we have sorted them into the three groups based on corporate
reputation. The rationale behind this sequence is to rely on freely
available information. Because information on whether Compustat
data are available for a particular firm can be obtained only at cost,
we cannot form our deciles of most- and least-admired firms based
on this information. The negative side effect of this procedure is that
the least-admired decile is left with fewer firms than the most-
admired decile because the least-admired firms, which tend to be
smaller, are more likely to lack the Compustat data. Nevertheless,
our results are robust to alternative sorting procedures.
5. These results accord with the findings of Shefrin and Statman
(1995, 1998), who further note that the most-admired firms’ dual
characteristics of large market capitalizations and low book-to-
market ratios are the very ones that researchers such as Fama and
French (1992) associate with low returns. Shefrin and Statman
therefore hypothesize that investing in well-regarded firms produces
disappointing returns, but they do not test this hypothesis directly.
6. Beta measures the risk of an individual stock from the perspec-
tive of a well-diversified investor. Statistically, it is defined as the
covariance of the returns on the stock with the market return divided
by the variance of the market return.
7. If a firm is delisted during a given annual holding period, the
missing returns from the day of delisting until the end of the holding
period are replaced with returns on a value-weighted index of  New
York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ
stocks. This procedure eliminates a potential survivorship bias.
8. We define an abnormal return as the difference between the
return on a reputation portfolio and the return on the market index.
A positive abnormal return means that the reputation portfolio has
outperformed the market index. Although the most-admired decile
outperformed the market index by an average of 3.7 percent, the
least-admired decile underperformed it by only 1.6 percent. This
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Five-Year Returns on Deciles of Portfolios Formed 
on the Basis of Executives’ and Analysts’ Opinions
Percent return
Sources: For rankings, Fortune magazine survey America’s Most Admired 
Companies (1985-95); for returns data, Center for Research of Stock Prices.
Notes: Portfolios are formed at the start of April after the survey publication and 
are held for five years. Each April, the stocks that were delisted during the year 
are eliminated from the portfolios and the remaining stocks are rebalanced into 
equally weighted portfolios. The bars show returns based on five-year, buy-and-
hold investments. For example, investment in the decile of executives’ most-
admired firms yields an average cumulative return of 125 percent over the five 
years following portfolio formation. The last bar represents the returns on an 
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asymmetry arises because the market index had lower average
returns than did the firms in our sample. For the same reason, our
third portfolio—containing the other eight deciles—outperformed
the market index by an average of 1.3 percent a year.
9. Our results do not necessarily contradict those of Fama and
French, because our sample is a subset of their firms and our time
period differs from theirs. However, some researchers have shown
that the Fama and French results are not particularly robust. Knez
and Ready (1997), for example, indicate that the size effect found by
Fama and French completely disappears after eliminating 1 percent
of the extreme return observations each month.
10. Mirroring our procedure for the sample firms, we construct the
reference portfolios at the beginning of each April; each stock in the
portfolios is given an equal weight and the weights are rebalanced at
the start of each April.
11. When calculating the test statistics, we are faced with the 
problem of a cross-sectional dependence in returns caused by the
persistence in the reputation rankings. Because we form portfolios
annually and calculate returns for holding periods up to five years,
the dependence in the returns can extend up to four years. To
address this problem, we compute the test statistics by using an esti-
mated variance-covariance matrix that includes the covariances up
to the fourth lag. For a more detailed discussion of this procedure,
see Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999).
12. Although the ratings by respondent group are not published in
Fortune, we obtained them from the magazine’s commercially avail-
able database. However, the breakdown of the data by respondent
group begins only in 1985, shortening by two years the sample
period used in this part of our study.
13. Recent behavioral models try to explain these anomalies by
appealing to investors’judgment biases. See Fama (1998) for a survey.
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